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Abstract. The “digital transformation” is perceived as the key enabler
for increasing wealth and well-being by politics, media and the citizens
alike. In the same vein, digital government steadily receives more and
more attention. Digital government gives rise to complex, large-scale
state-level system landscapes consisting of many players and technolog-
ical systems – and we call such system landscapes digital government
ecosystems. In this paper, we systematically approach the state-level ar-
chitecture of digital government ecosystems. We will discover the primacy
of the state’s institutional design in the architecture of digital govern-
ment ecosystems, where Williamson’s institutional analysis framework
supports our considerations as theoretical background. Based on that in-
sight, we will establish the notion of data governance architecture, which
links data assets with accountable organizations. Our investigation re-
sults into a digital government architecture framework that can help in
large-scale digital government design efforts through (i) separation of
concerns in terms of appropriate categories, and (ii) a better assessment
of the feasibility of envisioned digital transformations. With its focus on
data, the proposed framework perfectly fits the current discussion on
moving from ICT-driven to data-centric digital government.
Keywords: digital government · e-government · e-governance · new in-
stitutional economics · digital transformation · data governance · consent
management · data exchange layers · X-Road · GAIA-X
1 Introduction
The so-called “digital transformation” is currently perceived as a – or even the –
key enabler for increasing wealth and well-being by many in politics, the media
and among the citizens alike; and we find digital transformation initiatives as
crucial building blocks in today’s political agendas in all countries, recently, also
under the keyword “smart city”. In the same vein, digital government steadily
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receives more and more attention by governments, actually, ever since it became
mainstream in the 1990s under the name e-Government [1]. From all over the
world, we hear about many great success stories in digital government. At the
same time, when we look into concrete digital government projects, we often see
tremendous project expenditures (with millions or even billions of USDs, even for
single projects, are not an exception). Over and over again, we see project fail-
ures with tremendous cost overruns (millions, billions) and time overruns (years),
with results far below initial expectations or even complete project abortions.
Note, that we are not even talking about massive digital government initiatives
here, i.e., often, these problems already show in single digital government projects
that aim at realizing a single digital administrative process or delivering a single
e-service, e.g., a concrete e-health information system, a single e-court system, a
tax declaration service etc. How come? Our hypotheses is that essential aspects
of the state-level ecosystem, in which the several single digital government solu-
tions are realized are neglected (or: unknown, overlooked, not addressed properly
etc.) And indeed, digital government gives rise to complex-adaptive systems [46],
which are, actually, large-scale, state-level system landscapes consisting of many
players (authorities, companies, citizens) and technological systems – we call
such system landscapes digital government ecosystems.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to systematically examine the state-
level architecture of digital government ecosystems. As a crucial step, we will dis-
cover the primacy of the state’s institutional design, which, as we argue, provides
the core reference point for all system design efforts in digital government. Based
on that insight, we will establish the notion of data governance architecture. A
data governance architecture links data assets with accountable organizations
and represents the essence of co-designing institutions and technological systems
of a digital government ecosystem. In our endeavours, Williamson’s institutional
analysis framework will support us as a valuable theoretical background. Our
investigation results into a digital government architecture framework that can
help in large-scale digital government design efforts through (i) separation of
concerns in terms of appropriate categories, and (ii) a better assessment of the
feasibility of envisioned digital transformations.
Following the UN e-Government Survey 2020, a dominating theme in digital
government is to reach the ideal of a data-centric digital government. In a data-
centric digital government, data would be used pervasively in decision-masking
at all organizational levels and, beyond this, would enable the continuous opti-
mization and innovation of people-centric services. With current Big Data [31,
47] and data science technologies [45], the necessary tools are available to realize
such a data-centric digital government vision; however, yet, such data-centric
digital government is far from becoming the standard. With its focus on data,
the proposed architectural framework perfectly fits the current discussion on
moving to data-centric digital government. In particular, it can help in identi-
fying and understanding obstacles in the implementation of data-centric digital
government.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2, we briefly review the discussion of
data in the current digital government discourse. We look into the UN e-Govern-
ment Survey 2020 and what it tells us about the role of data in digital govern-
ment. The section is meant to serve as background information and motivation.
In Sect. 3 we explain, why institutions matter in the design of digital govern-
ment architectures. We discuss Koppenjan and Groenewegen’s systems design
framework and briefly explain Oliver Williamson’s institutional analysis frame-
work. In Sect. 4 we establish the notion of data governance architecture and
the notion of digital government solution architecture; we explain, how they re-
late to each other and to the state’s institutional architecture. We arrange these
components (data governance architecture, solution architecture, institutional
architecture) into an architectural framework and aim at explaining the mutual
dependent dynamics of changing these components. In Sect. 5, we review a se-
ries of digital government technologies against the background of the proposed
architectural framework. Here, a digital government technology is a technology
that have been explicitly designed for digital government or is otherwise relevant
for building digital government systems. Among others, we look in the Estonian
X-Road data exchange layer, the European federated data infrastructure initia-
tive GAIA-X, and Tim Berner Lee’s web-decentralization project Solid (Social
Linked Data). The purpose of the section is, on the one hand, to reinforce the
line of arguments embodied in the architectural framework and, on the other
hand, to provide some confidence in the industrial-strength applicability of the
framework. In Sect. 6 we further discuss the suggested digital government archi-
tecture framework. We discuss, in how far the framework can help in large-scale
digital government design efforts. Also, we discuss how the framework is placed
in the tension between e-democracy and e-administration. We finish the paper
with a conclusion in Sect. 7.
2 From ICT-Driven to Data-Centric
In today’s organizations, IT is about data processing, about the collection and
manipulation of data in support of the business processes [15, 17]. But it is also
about reporting on the basis of available data, in service of decision making [28]
and knowledge management [53]. It is similar – at a higher level – in digital
government. In digital government, we have a great deal of ICT being used to
make administrative processes in the authorities as well as in between authorities
more efficient and effective, however, the huge potential is now in exploiting
data for better decision making and leveraging innovations. In that vein, the UN
Agenda for Sustainable Development 2030 has stated:
“Quality, accessible, timely and reliable disaggregated data will be
needed to help with the measurement of progress and to ensure that
no one is left behind.” [69]
(1)
In the note [68], the Committee of Experts on Public Administration of the
UN Economic and Social Council identifies three main principles of effective
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Approach Description
ICT-driven Where Governments are highly influenced by the use of new and
existing information and communications technology (ICT).
Data-
informed
Where Governments are guided by data; data play an inferential role
in policymaking, with the understanding that data will inform rather
than drive decision-making because there are rational, political and
moral elements of decision-making and data are just one important
aspect of the process [63].
Data-driven Where Governments use analytics and algorithms in decision-making




Where policy approaches reflect the practical application of the
findings of the best and most current research available [...]
Data-centric Where Governments place data and data science at the core of public
administration; data are seen as a key asset and central to
government functions and are leveraged for the provision, evaluation
and modification of people-centric services [14].
Table 1. “Data as a key resource for Governments” [67]; literally compiled from the
SOURCE: E-Government Survey 2020 [67], p. 150.
governance for sustainable development: effectiveness, accountability and inclu-
siveness. The UN e-Government Survey 2020 [67] systematically has screened
the indicators and strategies that are connected to these three principles for
those that are directly or indirectly related to data. And it finds many of them;
here, we list a selection of them (for the full list see Table 6.2 in [67], p. 149):
“investment in e-government”, “monitoring and evaluation”, “strategic plan-
ning and foresight”, “results-based management”, “performance management”,
“financial management and control”, “risk management frameworks”, “science-
policy interface”, “network-based governance”, “open government data”, “bud-
get transparency”, “independent audit”, “participatory budgeting”, “long-term
territorial planning and spatial development”[67, 68]
All of this strongly indicates the relevance of data for digital government.
Different countries utilize data following different approaches, with different at-
titudes. The UN e-Government Survey 2020 [67] distinguishes between five such
approaches: (i) ICT-driven, (ii) data-informed, (iii) data-driven, (iv) evidence-
based, and (v) data-centric, see Table 1. Those are not merely qualitative char-
acterizations of different possible approaches, but, clearly, the UN survey wants
to express a “ranking” with the sequence (i)–(v), as it states the following in
regards to Table 1 (Table 6.3 in [67]): “Table 6.3 shows the different approaches
countries take and reflects a progression of sorts, illustrating how government
data are increasingly leveraged for effective governance.”[67] In that sense, the
data-centric digital government seems to be the ideal to be reached. The ques-
tion remains, what such data-centric digital government should be. It is clear,
as it is put at the top of the ranking imposed by (i)–(v), that data are used
here most pervasively (as compared with (i)–(iv), and most strategically, i.e., as
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“key asset”). As eventual purpose, it is said that “data [...] are leveraged for the
provision, evaluation and modification of people-centric services”. Sure, people-
centric sounds splendid – an eyecatcher. But what are people-centric services?
Are they services to the citizens? Or to the government? Is people-centricity just
a synonym for inclusiveness, which would be nice, or is it something else? Is it
something that the citizens actually want? Without a definition, it is not possible
to answer such and similar questions. The case study provided by the UN Survey
is frightening in this regard, i.e., “The data-centric online-offline integration of
digital government in Shanghai” (Box 6.1, p. 157 [67]). The digital government
described in this success story incorporates the super-application [43] WeChat –
a central building block of China’s futuristic next-generation citizen surveillance
programme, see the respective Human Rights Watch web page4, compare also
with, e.g., [49, 2]. The Gartner Group Report of Andrea Di Maio [14], which
is given as reference for the data-centric digital government by the UN survey,
does not help clarifying the concept of people centricity – it does not mention
the notion of people-centric at all.
There are still vast, yet unused, opportunities to exploit data at state level
to better the government’s effectiveness, accountability and inclusiveness. At
the same time, there are huge risks that citizens’ data are exploited for citizens’
monitoring and control. The challenge is in getting the data governance structure
right. And this challenge needs to be understood early in all digital government
design issues and, therefore, needs to be reflected in each approach to digital
government architecture.
3 On Large-Scale ICT Systems and Institutions
Digital government ecosystems need to be analyzed and designed as socio-tech-
nical systems. In analysis of digital government ecosystems, we can receive guid-
ance from Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory [40], which “treats the social and
the technical as inseparable” [72]. When it comes to design, a digital government
ecosystem needs to be co-designed with respect to its institutional architecture
and its technological assets.
In [37], Koppenjan and Groenewegen have provided a framework for the co-
design of technological assets and institutions of complex, large-scale, technolog-
ical systems – with foundations in Williamson’s new institutional economics [74].
The class of systems that are addressed by Koppenjan and Groenewegen can be
characterized simply as exactly those systems that have institutions as part of
their solution, in particular, with resp. organizations that are not merely con-
sumers of the solution, but make essential contributions to the solution, and that
“have institutions” (i.e., have institutional setups) that matter. The class of these
systems encompass systems such “energy networks, water management services
(drinking water, sewage, protection, management), waste treatment, transport
systems (rail, road, water, tube), industrial networks, information systems and
4 https://www.hrw.org/tag/mass-surveillance-china
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Level Purpose Frequency
L1 (social theory) Embeddedness: informal





L2 (economics of property rights) Institutional
Environment : formal rules of the game – esp.






L3 (transaction cost economics) Governance:
play of the game – esp. contract (aligning






L4 (Neo-classical economics / agency theory):






Table 2. Economics of institutions; literally compiled from SOURCE: Williamson
1998 [74].
telecommunication networks, city service [...].”[37]. Rather obvious, many digital
government solutions would fall into this category. No later than when it comes
to whole digital government ecosystems at the level of states, the whole system
can be conceived as belonging to this system class. For example, we have suc-
cessfully used Koppenjan and Groenewegen’s framework to compare the digital
government ecosystems of the Netherlands and Estonia [7].
Koppenjan and Groenewegen’s (henceforth: KaG’s) framework deals with the
design process, and also with questions of the design of the design process (called
‘process design’ in [37]), and elaborates a four-level model for institutional anal-
ysis, which is ingrained in Williamson’s institutional analysis framework (the de-
tails of differences between KaG’s institutional model and Williamson’s frame-
work are not relevant to the discussions in this paper and we will not delve
into them). KaG’s framework fits scenarios, in which a solution is designed from
scratch, as well as scenarios, in which some institutions already exist and need to
become subject of re-design. The key insight (key takeway) from KaG’s frame-
work for our framework in Sect. 4 is that, whenever the shape of institutions
is crucial for a solution, it needs to be incorporated into the design efforts of
the solution. However, beyond that, we do not want our framework in Sect. 4
to be understood as a specialization KaG’s framework, and also not as an ex-
tension of Kag’s framework. We step from considering the design of large-scale
solutions to the design of ecosystems of solutions. Such an ecosystem consists of
many solutions (in our case, typically, a phletora of solutions; each owned by a
different organization). At the same time, we specialize to digital government,
which means, in particular, that our architectural considerations are always at
state-level, i.e., address the state as a whole. Furthermore, we can assume that
digital government ecosystems are never build from scratch, as a result of the ex-
isting institutional backbone. Building digital government ecosystem is, in major
chunks, about adjusting and re-designing institutions.
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We want to choose Williamson’s institutional analysis framework as a the-
oretical underpinning. In Table 2, we have compiled the “four levels of social
analysis” of the framework (from Fig. 1 in [74]). In [74, 75], the analysis frame-
work is presented as part of wider discussions of new institutional economics.
Institutions at the several levels, L1 trough L4, continuously evolve, at different
pace and with different volatility; where they all influence each other (back and
forth, even across several levels) in this evolvement. Level L1 is about culture
at the societal level. Here, the level of analysis is about history and social sci-
ence [29, 52]. Level L2 is about laws, regulations, government, i.e., formal rules.
The investigation of this level dates back to Ronald Coase’s ‘The Problem of
Social Cost’ [12]. Level L3 is about organizational governance, in particular,
in so far it concerns inter-organizational transactions. It is the level of Coase’s
‘The Nature of the Firm’ [13]. Level L4 is the level of neoclassical economics
(price/output, supply/demand etc.) as well as agency theory [32].
An institution is a compound of informal rules (social norms, customs, tra-
ditions, commitments etc.) and formal rules (legislation, regulations, contracts
etc). An organization is an organized group of people. Organization adhere to
institutions. Sometimes, institution is used to denote a group of people, for ex-
ample, it might be that the “family” is called an institution. However, here we
would usually not mean a particular group of people but rather the set of typical
norms that shape families and that families adhere to, i.e., the notion of family.
Similarly, in everyday language, some organizations are often called institutions,
in particular, organization from the public sector: the police, a particular univer-
sity etc. Douglass North defines institutions as “as humanly devised constraints
that structure political, economic, and social interactions. They consist of both
informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of con-
duct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights!)” [54].
When we explain our digital government architecture framework in Sect. 4,
we use the notions of
– state’s institutions,
– (state’s) institutional architecture,
– accountable organizations.
The state’s institutions encompass all kinds of informal and formal rules existing
in the society, in particular legislation, in so far they are relevant for government.
We do not attempt a precise definition of “relevant for government” here. The
notion of the state’s institutional architecture is almost synonym to the state’s
institutions. It merely stresses the fact, that the state’s institutions show mu-
tually dependencies and interplay with each other. For the sake of the paper,
the accountable organizations are deliberately formed, formal organizations and
encompass all kinds of organizations from the public sector (agencies, authori-
ties, offices, bureaus, commissions, chambers, chancelleries, public bodies, min-
istries, etc.) and organizations from the private sector (companies on behalf of
public-private partnership, non-governmental organizations, associations etc.).
Throughout the paper, we use also state’s organizations for the organizations
from the public sector for short.
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4 Digital Government Architecture
This section aims at elaborating a digital government architecture framework,
depicted in Fig. 1, that is, essentially, based on the following line of hypotheses:
– The state’s institutions are formed following the state’s functions. The en-
tirety of the state’s institutions, how they are shaped and the way how they
interplay makes the state’s institutional architecture. The institutional ar-
chitecture usually changes slowly. More precise: substantial changes to the
institutional architecture, i.e., those that are the result of societal change,
usually occur non-disruptively and take significant time.
– The state’s institutional architecture determines the state’s data governance
architecture. The data governance architecture links data assets with ac-
countable organizations along two dimensions: the interoperability dimension
and the provisioning dimension.
– The data governance architecture limits the design space of the digital gov-
ernment solution architecture, which consists of all digital administrative pro-
cesses and delivered e-services, i.e., those assets that are eventually perceived
as digital government by end-users and citizens. The digital government so-
lution architecture can show small, ad-hoc and fast changes.
– Changes in the institutional architecture are so severe, that they can trigger
immediate changes in the digital government solution architecture, whereas
changes in digital government solution architecture (usually) can only have
a long-term influence on changes in the institutional architecture.
In our framework, we say that the data governance architecture and the
digital government solutions architecture together form the digital government
architecture. The data governance architecture forms the backbone, or let us say,
the core of the digital government architecture that deals with the necessary
fulfilment of data governance; whereas the solutions architecture addresses all
kinds of quality aspects of the offered solutions, i.e., usefulness, adherence to
good service-design principles, maturity of processes etc.
It is important to note that the discussed architectural framework is not
limited to transforming the classic services of public administration or what we
would call e-administration. Our concept of e-service delivery in Fig. 1 definitely
encompasses all e-services, also from the realm of what we would call e-democracy
including initiatives such as open government data, e-participation, or i-voting.
In the current section, we rather not delve into a discussion of the different kinds
of state functions. This is deferred to Sect. 6, where we look into digital govern-
ment architecture in the tension between e-democracy and e-administration.
We claim that a key to understand architecture of digital government ecosys-
tems is in understanding data governance. In the context of digital government,
data governance is an ultra large-scale, cross-organizational challenge. As a
next step, we need to discuss the most important data governance principles
in Sect. 4.1, before we can continue with a definition of data governance archi-
tecture in Sect. 4.2.
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Data Governance Architecture
Data assets are linked to accountable organizations 
along with data governance principles.
• Interoperability dimension
• Provisioning dimension
Digital Government Solution Architecture
+ Digital Administrative Processes
+ e-Service Delivery
Institutional Architecture




Fast, ad-hoc, small 
changes























Fig. 1. A digital government architecture framework.
4.1 Data Governance Principles
When it comes to the single authority or organization, data governance is always
about responsibility for adherence with data governance principles; often, it is
about accountability for adherence with data governance principles. Account-
ability goes beyond responsibility, i.e., it is given whenever the relevant data
governance principles are subject to laws and regulations. If data governance
principles are merely recommendations or best practices, we call them soft data
governance principles; if they are subject to laws or regulations, we call them
hard or strict data governance principles.
In today’s digital government initiatives, the following (partially overlapping
and mutually dependent) categories of data governance principles can be iden-
tified:
– Data Protection Principles.
• Minimality Principles. Citizens’ data are collected, stored and processed
only for defined purposes and for defined time periods. Data are deleted,
if the purpose of its storage becomes obsolete. Depending on the data
category, the citizen has the right to enforce the deletion of his or her
data.
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• Transparency Principles. The citizen has the right to know, for which
purposes and time periods his or her data are collected, stored and pro-
cessed. As an advanced principle, for certain data categories, he or she
has the right to know the data processing history, i.e., who has accessed
his or her data when and for which purpose.
• Consent Principles. Depending on the data category, the citizen has the
right to determine whether his or her data are stored. Consent can be
granted resp. withdrawn as opt-in or opt-out.
– Data Quality Principles. Correctness and consistency (resp. non-redundancy),
including referential integrity (which is particularly challenging in cross-
organizational settings such as digital government [64]). Or, in terms of
ISO 25012 [30]: accuracy; completeness; consistency; creditability; current-
ness. Etc.
– The Once-Only Principle. The once-only principle (OOP) [38, 36] is about
ensuring that “citizens and businesses supply the same information only once
to a public administration”[23].
Observe that actually following these principles may come with a cost, and
higher costs in combination with little to no direct gain for the state agencies
will make it less likely that the principles are actually followed. Assessing the
costs and gains of a data governance principle in a concrete scenario is a diffi-
cult, complex endeavor. The cheapest among these appears to be the minimality
principle: collecting less data is typically cheaper than collecting more. On the
other hand, deleting data after a prescribed time period is already associated
with a cost. Similarly, the data quality principles are important for the function-
ing of the e-administration and are thus expected to be followed. On the other
hand, transparency, consent and the once-only principles provide rather few – if
any – immediate benefits to the e-administration; and their implementation is
associated with significant costs. Hence, these principles are always less likely to
be followed.
On Data Consent The relationship between the citizen and the state authori-
ties is different from the relationship between a company and its customers, as it
is again different between a company and their employees. This matters in so far,
as the citizen has no consent right for all kind of data. In accordance with the
minimality principle, the state can consider (and regulate) certain citizen data as
critical; only beyond this, the consent principle applies. Following the minimality
principle, we would expect that critical data are usually master data; whenever
it comes, e.g., to log data, trajectory data, or any kind of aggregated personal
data, we would expect that a consent principle is granted. Super-application such
as Tencent’s WeChat in China, as we have described in [43], are the counter-
example. We would not count such an application as digital government. In the
ideal world, each digital government initiative is expected to be in service of
strengthening our democracies, independent of whether the concrete initiative
follows a democratic or rather a technocratic narrative [19].
On State-Level Architecture of Digital Government Ecosystems 11
Data consent comes with several synonyms, each with different flavors and
different, yet overlapping communities, such as MyData, Self Data, Internet of
Me, or PIMS (Personal Information Management Services), compare with the
MyData Declaration5.
Consent Management The first question of consent management is whether
and how citizens can actually block or enable data collection and processing. We
argue that building such mechanisms is complex, expensive and may lower the
efficiency of e-administration, despite the positive aspects such as increased trust.
For example, in the digital government system practiced in Estonia there are
almost no consent management mechanisms for citizens. The first pilot project
for managing consent (in the context of providing health data to insurers) will
be launched in 2021. Instead, a specialized state authority acts as an overseer of
digital government systems with the goal to block the unnecessary collection of
citizen data, i.e., enforcing the minimality principle. As an additional mechanism,
several digital government systems participate in a monitoring system enabling
citizens to see when and why their personal data has been transferred from one
organization to another. However, participation in this monitoring system is not
obligatory and most state organizations do not participate in it, apparently in
order to avoid related development costs.
Need for systematic consent management arises also as companies enter the
scene. The players in a digital government ecosystem are not restricted to gov-
ernment authorities. Companies and other organization, that are no government
authorities can be involved on behalf of public-private partnership (PPP) [55].
On the Once-Only Principle and Data Consistency At a first sight, the
once-only principle (OOP), looks rather like a service design principle than a
data governance principle, as we have said that it is about not asking the same
data from the citizen more than once. It becomes a data governance principle
as it can only be resolved by joint coordination efforts of all authorities of the
digital government ecosystem together. Sometimes, you can hear that the once-
only principle is about not storing a data item in more than one location. But it is
not. As an example, a simple act of transferring data from one system to another
immediately yields a replication of data in different locations. It is also usual –
and architecturally sensible – to cache some of the transferred data for longer
time in order to avoid frequent requests for the same data items from external
sources. Similarly, adherence to the once-only principle cannot help with data
consistency, which is a data quality principle. Similarly, it can not help resolving
lack of consistency in cross-organizational transactions (long transactions) [20].
All in all, the OOP appears to be beneficial to the citizens interacting with the
e-services, but not so much to the efficiency of e-administration.
5 https://mydata.org/declaration/
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4.2 Data Governance Architecture Defined
Each digital government ecosystem has a data governance architecture. A data
governance architecture links data assets to accountable organizations along with
data governance principles.
First, there is a primary institutional design of the state authorities. This
design follows the branches of the state’s government with all its entities from
the executive, judiciary, and legislature – embodying the entire public adminis-
tration. The authorities are designed following the functions to be fulfilled by the
state’s government, following the principle of separation of powers, implement-
ing checks and balances and targeting good governance principles. This primary
institutional design is hierarchical and cannot, in general, be arbitrarily changed.
Of course, we sometimes see that ministries are re-shaped, e.g., a super ministry
might be formed by merging; a new ministry might appear in a legislation period
and again disappear in the next etc. However, at the lower level, changing the
primary institutional design amounts to major efforts or even reforms.
The state authorities need to collect citizen data to fulfill there functions. By
collecting and processing citizen data they become accountable for the fulfill-
ment of data governance principles. This is how data governance architecture is
determined by the institutional design. Actually, we can see now that the data
governance architecture is the architecture of the digital government ecosystem
per se. Indeed, data governance may be determined by legislation. For example,
in the case of Estonia, both the obligation and right to collect and store specific
kinds of data are given to organizations by lower-level legislative acts. These acts
then become a primary enforcer for the creation or modification of corresponding
IT systems.
A data governance architecture achieves the following. It creates a correspon-
dence between data assets and accountable organizations together with lists of
specified data governance principles. More precisely:
A data governance architecture specifies for each data asset α, each
accountable organization ω, and each data governance principle γ, in
how far exactly ω is accountable for α in regards of γ.
(2)
The complete description of a data governance architecture as defined in (2)
can quickly become quite complex, because there can be overlaps. Several differ-
ent organizations might be accountable with respect to the same data asset and
data governance principle. Then, it needs to be clarified, what there specific roles
are with respect to this data asset in regards to the resp. data governance prin-
ciple and how they interplay. Actually, we have used accountability as a rather
broad term in (2). An accountability in (2) can come in various forms and need to
be specified in each single case. In particular, accountability comes with different
levels of strictness; a typical approach is, e.g., to distinguish accountabilities in a
range from accountable (in a more narrow sense then) as the most strict notion
(as hard legal accountability) over responsible to consulted [58]. We will make
no attempt here to elaborate a concrete data governance specification approach.
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We have seen that the data governance architecture essentially follows the
primacy of the institutional design; but, at the same time there is some degree
of freedom in how the concrete data governance architecture materializes. This
degree of freedom shows in two dimensions:
– IT system interoperability
– IT service provision
the first dimension is about IT system interoperability (or just interoper-
ability for short) and the second dimension is about IT service provision (or
just provisioning for short). The distinction of these two dimension is crucial
in design efforts for digital government solutions; we delve into the IT system
interoperability dimension in Sect. 4.3 and the IT service provision dimension in
Sect. 4.4.
4.3 IT System Interoperability
IT system interoperability and its objective, i.e., IT system integration [76],
form a major strand of digital government efforts [25] and digital government
research [62, 41, 42]. We explain interoperability via the transformation of data
governance architecture in service of strengthening data governance principles
as follows. In principle, there is no need for interoperability. Each authority of
the primary institutional design could collect and hold all the citizen data it
needs. In such a trivial, ad-hoc data governance architecture it is likely to have
many data assets redundantly held in several authorities, resulting in signifi-
cant issues: overall lower data quality, potential inconsistencies, violation of the
once-only principle, higher risk of violation of data protection principles (min-
imality, transparency), difficulties in consent management; hand-in-hand with
an increased amount of stakes/efforts in accountability. If an authority stops to
collect and hold citizen data, it has to request the data it needs (as transac-
tional data) from peer authorities that grant them access to these data assets,
i.e., interoperability becomes necessary. The introduction of interoperability can
change the data governance architecture to a better one. We see that interop-
erability cannot be simply explained as the result of legacy system integration,
instead, it can be shaped along with the design space of the data governance
architecture.
Interoperability has several key aspects:
– Physical Access to Data. For one organization/system, in order to access data
of another organization/system, special parts of the IT systems have to be
built. Typically, these come in the form of APIs (Application Programming
Interfaces) enabling one system to query specific data from another.
– Access Management. Since the data to be transferred is typically not public,
both systems must be able to verify the identity of the other system and the
existence of actual rights or agreements for transferring data.
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– Semantic Interoperability. Both the nomenclature, the meaning and the way
data are encoded in one system may be different from how it is understood or
encoded in another. To facilitate the use of external data, special translation
systems have to be developed.
The Estonian governmental data exchange platform X-Road described later
in Sect. 5.1 targets both the physical access and access management aspects,
but not the semantic interoperability aspect. Indeed, as the number of different
systems and their interconnections grows, the semantic interoperability is be-
coming the most expensive part of interoperability. Due to the immaturity of
the technology devoted to semantic aspects of data, this component is typically
implemented by non-automated programming, i.e., costly analysis and devel-
opment work which is repeated anew for most new connections made between
different systems.
4.4 IT Service Provision
Multi-tenancy, IT service provision, cloud computing: different terminology for
almost the same thing (differences are in the decade, in which the terminologies
have been used mostly; and in the technology stack usually connected to them).
An IT service provider can increase resilience (this way decreasing risk) and take
over responsibility, this way lowering the accountability stake. Often, IT service
provision is assessed as the exact opposite by accountable stakeholders, i.e., as
increasing risk. This is so, if the stakeholder does not trust or cannot trust the
IT service provider (e.g., due to the lack of a sufficient regulatory framework –
think of the “safe harbor” debate alone), i.e., if he or she needs to consider the IT
service provider as the risk in itself. For example, it is common for governments
to require that data managed by the state’s organizations has to be stored in the
servers physically located in the country. Even more, often government prefer to
store data in data centres over which they have direct control: these data centers,
on the other hand, may or may not be owned and managed by companies on
behalf of public-private partnership.
The introduction of an IT service provider makes this provider a player in
the digital government ecosystem. The introduction of an IT service provider
changes the data governance architecture, but more fundamentally as in the
interoperability dimension that we described in Sect. 4.3. The interoperability
dimension is about shaping accountabilities only; the provisioning dimension is
indeed about changing the institutional architecture, as indicated by the dashed
arrow in Fig. 1. These changes are usually conservative changes, i.e., they ex-
tend the existing institutional architecture without changing roles of existing
institutions and the interplay between existing institutions. For example, the
establishment of a national central data center that hosts the data of the state
agencies might not be considered a change to the institutional architecture, but it
actually is. The role of the data center needs to be fixed and legally underpinned.
The interplay of the data center with the other agencies need to be regulated and
established. Now we are in a dilemma. Once the data center is fully established
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as an organization, provisioning turns out to be interoperability in our frame-
work (and technically, i.e., disregarding the distinction in our framework, ICT
provisioning is a form of interoperability anyhow). So, how can we distinguish
ICT provision from interoperability any longer? And: should we we distinguish
ICT provision from interoperability at all? We could distinguish provisioning
from interoperability by introducing a notion of genuine functions of the state
as opposed to digital-government-related functions. Actually, it is fair to state,
that provision of digital solutions itself is a distinguishable function of the state.
With respect to the question, whether we should maintain the distinction be-
tween provisioning and interoperability; yes, we think it is important. Actually,
it is a distinction that is of utmost importance in practice, for example, it shows
in the distinction between data controllers and data processors in the European
GDPR regulation (General Data Protection regulation), as we will explain in
due course in Sect. 4.6. Also, the differences are often overlooked or neglected,
when it comes to discussion of alternative architectural approaches and styles,
in particular, in the analysis of centralization vs. decentralization – we will delve
into a discussion of centralization vs. decentralization again in Sect. 4.6.
4.5 Evolving Digital Government
The digital government solution architecture shapes the digital administrative
processes and the e-service delivery of the government authorities. Digital admin-
istrative processes run inside the authorities and inter-organizational, between
the authorities. e-Services are delivered to citizens and companies and allow
for triggering digital administrative processes. However, digital administrative
processes need no e-service to be triggered. Administrative processes can be dig-
itized (typically always for the sake of making them more efficient and effective)
without re-shaping the interaction with the citizens and companies. In public
perception and discussion, digital government is often identified with e-service
delivery. However, many digital administrative processes actually run without
being triggered through e-services. The ratio of administrative processes that are
triggered by e-services is actually an interesting, however, often hard to assess or
even hard to estimate, indicator for the maturity of digital government, compare
with Sect. 5.1.
The state’s institutional architecture does not change quickly. Despite smaller
adjustments, changes to the institutional architecture are severe, as they reflect
changes to the state’s functions. A change to the institutional architecture can
immediately trigger changes in the solution architecture. Often, in practice, we
observe, that changes to the digital government architecture can then be very
cost-intensive or even fail. The reason for this is, in general, in the efforts needed
to adjust the interoperability and the provisioning dimension of the data gov-
ernance architecture. Digital government projects that deal with administrative
processes inside a single authority can be executed, in principle, without changing
the data governance architecture. Still, those projects often fail. But the reason
for such this is only in lack of ICT maturity, i.e., with respect to IT gover-
nance, IT management, used ICT technologies etc. These are practical problems
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that are not specific to digital government but can concern all large-scale ICT
projects. The question, whether public organization typically rather have a lower
ICT maturity (as compared to private companies) is independent of that.
Small, ad-hoc changes to the solution architecture are always possible – as
long as these changes do not require changes to the data governance architecture.
Such small changes do not lead to direct changes in the institutional architec-
ture. They can contribute, in the long run, to a change of the state’s functions
(by changing people’s awareness, attitudes, minds), and on behalf of that to the
institutional architecture. Take participatory budgeting as an example. Surely,
a single agency in a single municipality could easily realize some participatory
budgeting. (At least, technically and organizationally they could easily; whether
they are allowed in regards of the surrounding regulatory framework, i.e., the
institutional environment, is exactly again a different question). But a single
agency in a single municipality introducing participatory budgeting would make
no huge difference at state level, not even at municipality level. Only a system-
atic, state-level participatory budgeting initiative would also lead to a change in
the institutional architecture.
These considerations also set limits to the notion of disruptive technology. As
soon as institutional architecture is critically involved, technology itself cannot
be disruptive. A technology can disrupt a market, but only in the boundaries of
the established “formal rules of the game” [74]. A technology can never disrupt
a state or a society as a whole, as long as the respective state or society is
non-dysfunctional.
4.6 Data Governance Architecture in Practice
The Case of the European GDPR Regulation Understanding the inter-
operability dimension and the provisioning dimension as described in Sects. 4.3
and 4.4 is a key to architecture of digital government ecosystems. For example,
the dimensions are also reflected in the European General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) [24]. The GDPR introduces the notions of data controller and
data processor as follows:
(i) “A data controller is a key decision makers [sic]. They have the overall say
and control over the reason and purposes behind data collection and over
the means and method of data processing.”6
(ii) “If two or more controllers have the control over purposes and processes,
then they are joint controllers. However, this doesn’t [sic] apply if they are
using the same data for different purposes.”6
(iii) “A data processor will act on behalf of the controller. They only operate via
instructions from the controller.”6
(iv) “Individual users can make claims for compensation and damages against
both [-a] processors and [-b] controllers.”6
6 https://www.gdpreu.org/the-regulation/key-concepts/data-controllers-and-
processors/
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In our context, the data controller (i) is an entity (authority, organization,
company etc.) that collects/holds/uses data. (i) also assigns the accountability
with respect to the minimality principle to the data controller, where the ac-
countability emerges from (iv-b). (ii) is about the interoperability dimension; it
clarifies the accountability of entities that exchange data; however, only for the
case that the data are used for the same purpose. (iii) is about the provisioning
dimension – we would call a data processor simply an IT service provider; and
again, (iv-a) clarifies the accountability in the provisioning dimension.
From the GDPR example we also learn the following. It is important to
understand that the interoperability dimension and the provisioning are crucial,
in general. But then it is also crucial to understand their details when it comes
to concrete regulatory frameworks.
Centralization vs. De-Centralization Often, in digital government system
design efforts, it comes to a discussion of centralization vs. decentralization, e.g.,
in the implementation of data exchange solutions. In such discussions, arguments
are often misleading, e.g, because they mix technical with organizational argu-
ments at levels that do not fit, or neglect complex relationships between the
technological design and institutional design of large-scale systems. A typical
argument (that we heard occasionally) might be for example:
“We cannot use an ESB (Enterprise Service Bus) implementation,
because citizens cannot trust a centralized government.”
(3)
In a practical project, we cannot ignore a statement such as (3) either, as it
surely expresses an important concern.
The point in digital government ecosystem architecture is to systematically
decouple considerations from each other along the described interoperability and
provisioning dimension, always against the background of a well-understood data
governance architecture. Meaning: when we discuss centralization, we first need
to clarify and create awareness of the context of the discussion (the same with de-
centralization). Are we discussing a centralization in the institutional architecture
or are we discussing a centralization in the digital government architecture, com-
pare again with Fig. 1? If we discuss a centralization in the digital government
architecture, are we discussing it with respect to the interoperability dimension
or with respect to the provisioning dimension? For example, a centralization
of entities in the primary institutional design is completely different issue from
nominating an organization as a data steward in the interoperability dimension
of a data governance architecture. And this is again different from establish-
ing an organization in the provisioning dimension, for example, an organization
that hosts a message-oriented middleware component or that acts, as yet an-
other example, as the certification authority (CA) of a public key infrastructure
(PKI).
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5 Established and Emerging e-Government Technologies
5.1 The X-Road Data Exchange Platform
X-Road [3, 33, 34, 73, 4, 35, 55, 61]7,8,9,10 is the data exchange platform of the Es-
tonian digital government ecosystem. X-Road is the only data exchange platform
that is mentioned in the UN e-Government Survey 2020 [67]: “The data exchange
platform in Estonia (X-Road) is administrated centrally to interconnect govern-
ment information systems and databases and allow government authorities and
citizens to securely send and receive information over the Internet within the
limits of their authority.”
The Estonian regulation on X-Road [59] defines: “1) the data exchange layer
of information systems (hereinafter X-Road) is a technical infrastructure and
instance between the members of X-Road, which enables secure online data
exchange, ensuring evidential value”.
X-Road is a peer-to-peer data exchange system teaming together
– a PKI (public key infrastructure),
– sophisticated software components for secure data exchange,
– a nomenclature of metadata items associated with each message along the
core representation language and structure of messages,
– systematic (regulated [59]) organizational measures.
The main technical component of X-Road is the security server. An instance
of the security server is installed by each authority and organization participat-
ing in X-Road (called X-Road members), i.e., there are many security servers
running that together realize the secure data exchange in a decentralized man-
ner. The security servers encrypt and decrypt messages, check the identity of
other servers and their access rights and preserve a log of messages. Each mem-
ber registers its e-services in a centrally administered directory. Each member
grants access to its e-services itself via the access right management of the se-
curity server, i.e., access management remains with the member, determining
which other members are allowed to access which of its services and data assets.
X-Road Usage Patterns The official statistics page of X-Road11 indicates,
as of January 2021, that there are almost 3000 different services on X-Road,
altogether answering approx. 162 million queries per month. Only approx. three
percent of the X-Road queries were initiated by private persons for their own
informational needs, whereas the absolute majority – 97% – were initiated by
a small category of very specific businesses and service providers as well as a
7 X-tee in Estonian; in English: originally pronounced as ‘crossroad’, nowadays pro-
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State Authority Queries per month
Employments Registry ≈ 40 million
System for Drug Prescriptions ≈ 10 million
e-Health System ≈ 10 million
Population Registry ≈ 10 million
Medical Insurance System ≈ 10 million
Table 3. Top five Estonian data providers (X-Road) as of January 2021.
large number of the several state’s organizations. To be more concrete, the five
top data providers for queries during the last month (January 2021) are listed in
Table 3. An important context information for these numbers is the population
size of Estonia with approx. 1.3 million people.
In our understanding, almost all the queries to the Employments Registry
and the Population Registry are expected to be made for the functioning of
e-administration, i.e., intra-organizational data exchange. However, the rest of
the top queries (drug prescriptions and health information) are mostly generated
by pharmacies selling prescription drugs and doctors writing, storing and using
personal medical data and prescribing drugs. Almost all the drug prescriptions
in Estonia are electronic and use the X-Road for data exchange. Soon after the
introduction of the system in 2010, it has been one of the most frequent sources
for X-Road queries.
Looking at the more detailed query statistics along with the X-Road visu-
alization tool12, we see that the next most active groups of X-Road users after
the ones listed in Table 3 are:
– Bailiffs: mainly querying the information from the tax and customs board.
– The Police: mainly querying information from the police databases and car
insurances.
– Ridango (a private company managing the sales of most of the public trans-
port e-tickets): querying information about student status, age and similar
information directly influencing the price of tickets.
Is X-Road De-Centralized? The technical basis of X-Road is decentralized.
In the actual data exchange, i.e., in sending messages, there is no middleware
component involved, as we would find, e.g., in ESB (enterprise service bus)
technology, see [16]. In the actual data exchange, there is no man-in-the-middle
involved, as we know it, e.g., from the value-add networks (VAN) back in the
days of EDI (electronic data exchange), again see [16]. The messages are sent
directly between members; but sending of messages is streamlined by the joint
protocol of X-Road, which is enforced through the obligatory usage of the secu-
rity server (either the available implementation, or an own implementation that
adheres to the X-Road security server specification). This does not mean, that
there is no centralization at all in X-Road. First, there is a state-managed central
12 https://logs.x-tee.ee/visualizer/EE/
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organization and the certification authority (CA) for establishing the PKI (pub-
lic key infrastructure) [65, 26]. Also, the information systems of members (that
are accessed then via the e-services of the members) have to be published and
confirmed by a registry maintained by the central authority, see the Estonian
“X-Road regulation”[59]. This registration process aims to enforce the minimal-
ity principle, the data quality principles and the once-only principle, compare
with Sects. 4.1. Enforcement of these principles is carried out by different state
authorities who have been assigned the task of auditing these aspects of all the
information systems registered as users of the X-Road system.
All of this concerns the basic data exchange mechanism provided by X-Road,
i.e., the X-Road platform. It does not mean that X-Road prevents centralized ser-
vices. Centralized services can be implemented on top of X-Road. The Estonian
Document Exchange Center (DEC) resp. Dokumendivahetuskeskuse (DVK) [21,
57, 18], was a perfect example for this – interestingly, the document exchange
center has been deprecated and supersesed by a de-centralized document ex-
change protocol, i.e., DHX (Dokumendivahetusprotokoll)13. As another example
for adding a centralized service, it is interesting to look at the concept of X-
Rooms, which is described in the vision document of Estonia’s Government CIO
Office on the next generation of digital government architecture [70]. An X-Room
is a publish-subscribe service, a standard pattern in message-oriented middle-
ware. If it is just a recommended architectural pattern for realizing e-services, it is
not necessarily about adding a centralized service; whereas, if it comes with pro-
visioning, it leads to a centralized service. Adding message-oriented middleware
components to a decentralized IT system architecture is standard in enterprise
computing. When adding a centralized component, this amounts to adjusting
the data governance architecture along the provisioning dimension as described
in Sect. 4.4.
Is X-Road based on Blockchain? X-Road is not based on blockchain. The
fact that the X-Road security server might exploit cryptographic data struc-
tures and algorithms that are also used by blockchain technology [51] (such as
Merkle trees [48] for implementing audit logs) does not make it a blockchain. A
blockchain – as introduced with the cryptocurrency Bitcoin by Satoshi Nakamoto
in 2019 [50] – is a peer-to-peer network that implements a distributed, repli-
cated database that achieves consensus via an entirely de-centralized consensus
protocol [5, 9]. X-Road makes no efforts to achieve consensus, except for authen-
tication, despite there is no centralized ledger. Although X-Road is not based
on blockchain technology, it has been sometimes perceived as such by the me-
dia. Therefore, in 2018, NIIS (the official product owner of X-Road) launched
an official statement14 that “there is no blockchain technology in the X-Road”.
What is true however (and what might have contributed to the fact that X-Road
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many of the Estonian state registries are secured by a so-called KSI blockchain
(keyless signature infrastructure) that we will describe further in due course in
Sect. 5.3.
X-Road Federation In 2014, Finland and Estonia decided to cooperate tightly
in developing further their digital government ecosystems. The Nordic Insti-
tute for Interoperability Solutions NIIS15 was founded as a joint agency of Fin-
land and Estonia and was made the official product owner of the X-Road code
base [27, 60]. In the sequel, X-Road was deployed as a data exchange platform
also in Finland and joint efforts were started to realize cross-border, federated
digital government services. For a discussion of challenges of and approaches to
federation of digital government ecosystem in the context of the case Finland-
Estonia, see [27].
Impact of X-Road The data exchange platform X-Road is mentioned in the
UN e-Government Surveys 2016, 2018 and 2020. The UN e-Government Survey
2018 uses X-Road to explain the concept of what they call “Government as an
API” [66], as follows:
“Estonia created X-Road, an application network for exchanging data among
agency systems so that all government services are effectively available in one
spot. In addition to offering querying mechanisms across multiple databases and
supporting the secure exchange of documents, X-Road seamlessly integrates dif-
ferent government portals and applications.
The private sector can also connect with X-Road to make queries and benefit
from access to a secure data exchange layer.
X-Road has made it possible to bring 99 per cent of public services online.
On average, 500 million queries per year are made annually using X-Road. In-
deed, its use has been estimated to save as many as 800 years of working time.
The solution has been equally successful in its roll-out to Finland, Azerbaijan,
Namibia, as well as the Faroe Islands. Furthermore, cross-border digital data ex-
changes have been set up between Estonia and Finland, making X-Road the first
cross-border data exchange platform. ”([66], Box 8.2. Government as an API, p.
184)
It is important to note, however, that X-Road is used primarily as a tool
of e-administration: it is not meant for nor is it used for directly providing e-
services or increasing citizen participation. The “public services” mentioned in
the last quote should be understood as either inter-organizational data exchange
services or information services for citizens, the software of which uses X-Road
for obtaining necessary data from other organizations.
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5.2 Other Data Exchange Platforms
Cybernetica UXP Cybernetica17 is a spin-off from the Estonian research in-
stitute Küberneetika18 (1969-2006, since 2007: Department of Cybernetics and
Department of Software Science of Tallinn University of Technology). Cyber-
netica designed and implemented crucial parts of the first versions of X-Road in
2001, including architecture, protocols, security solutions, security server. Nowa-
days, Cybernetica offers its own data exchange platform UXP as a product19,
which is partly based on the same prototype as X-Road version 6.
NLX NLX20 is a data exchange platform that is implemented on behalf of an
initiative of municipalities in the Netherlands. “NLX is an open source peer-to-
peer system facilitating federated authentication, secure connecting and proto-
colling in a large-scale, dynamic API ecosystem with many organizations.”21.
The system architecture of NLX is oriented towards X-Road, see Sect. 5.1.
GAIA-X In September 2020, GAIA-X has been founded as a non-profit orga-
nization by eleven companies from Germany plus eleven companies from France
under the aegis of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and En-
ergy (BMWi). According to GAIA-X, it wants “to create the next generation
of data infrastructure for Europe, its states, its companies and its citizens.”22.
GAIA-X targets federation; consequentially, semantic representation is among
its architectural principles [22]. Semantic interoperability is the key to cross-
border digital government solutions. A similar institutional design can be found
in the digital government ecosystems of several countries (several states of a
federal country). Where, e.g., the format of data assets of municipalities can be
centrally standardized respectively prescribed, this is not any more possible in
federated scenarios. Here, the differences in data format are a major obstacle
to successful digital transformation. A key success is in systematic efforts in
semantic description and semantic mapping of data assets.
5.3 Auxiliary Technologies for Digital Government
Keyless Signature Infrastructure Document timestamping solutions are
mission-critical in many organizational contexts. Organizations want to have
tamper-proof and provable document logs not only in the communications with
other organizations; they also want to be safe against failure (accidental or in-
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operations of its authorities and, again, the authorities want to trust the opera-
tions of their employees. Since 2007, Guardtime offers a document time stamping
solution as a service, i.e., the so called KSI blockchain (keyless signature infras-
tructure blockchain). In the Estonian digital government ecosytem, the solution
is successfully used to secure the healthcare registry, the property registry, the
succession registry, the digital court system and the state gazette [44].
The KSI blockchain achieves a practical implementation of an idea that goes
back to Stornetta et al. in 1993 [6], i.e., it stores timestamped document hashes
in a Merkle tree [48] and publishes the root hash of the tree periodically (e.g.,
once a month) in a newspaper (e.g., in the Financial Times, among others, in
case of the Guardtime solution) [10, 8], see also [9].
Solid Solid23 (Social Linked Data) is a technology originally designed and
advocated by Tim Berners Lee. Given the frustration over the state of data
sovereignty in the World Wide Web – with players such as Facebook and Alpha-
bet and data scandals such Cambridge-Analytica, Solid targets to free data from
applications: to reconnect people to their data, so to speak. The key concept of
Solid is the pod (personal online data store). A user stores his or her data in
a pod and grants applications access to these. The user decides where the pod
is stored and who can access it. In [11], Solid has been used in a pilot study
of local and regional governments of Flanders (one of the federated states of
Belgium) to “empower citizens in reusing their personal information online in
different contexts such as public services, banking, health insurance, and telecom
providers.”[11]. As such, this project provides a rigorous consent management
approach. Therefore, in the context of digital government ecosystems, the limits
to such approach are in the limits of consent management itself, as described in
Sect. 4.1.
6 Discussion
6.1 On Step-by-Step Emergence of Digital Government Solutions
Despite the formulation of all the digital government strategies, visions, agen-
das, and declarations, today’s digital governments are rather arbitrarily emerg-
ing instead of systematically evolving. See Fig. 2. A first digital solution is built.
During the design of the solution, the project learns, step-by-step, about the limi-
tations imposed by the underlying institutional architecture. The resulting data
governance architecture has the scope of the solution, it is a sub-architecture
encompassing only those organizations involved in the solution. A lot of effort
is usually invested into provisioning decisions, with the many different stake-
holders developing ad-hoc opinions on-the-fly. Slight adjustments are made to
the institutional architecture on behalf of provisioning, that seem to have little
impact, but actually embody new unpredictable constraints and limitations on
23 https://solidproject.org/





















Fig. 2. Step-by-step emergence of digital government solutions in a digital government
ecosystem.
future digital government solutions. Next, a further solution project is started
for a next digital government problem (problem/solution II in Fig. 2). All prob-
lems in shaping the data governance architecture are approached from scratch.
Overall, in this process, there is no learning curve. In general, the stakehold-
ers in the second project are different from those in the first; and there is no
knowledge transfer from the first to the second project, as there is no systematic
state-level knowledge management process. This means that the project needs
more efforts (is more costly) as it needed to be. A more severe problem is that
the design decision in the new project usually follow different design rationales
leading to different kinds of decision. The latter creates tension with in between
the projects; on the one hand, indirectly via the adjustments to the institutional
architecture and, one the other hand, directly – if the projects continue to run
in parallel (in future maintenance, follow-up projects etc.). The more digital so-
lutions emerge, the higher rise the tension and, actually, the project costs of new
projects.
It can be hoped, that the described frictional losses can be mitigated with
a deliberate state-level approach to systematically manage the emergence of
the single digital government solutions, this way turning this arbitrary process
into a systematic evolvement of digital government. We are convinced, that the
elaboration of an architectural framework (such as ours in Sect. 4.2) would be a
crucial step towards such systematically evolving digital government.







Fig. 3. Digital government architecture in the tension between e-democracy and
e-administration.
6.2 On e-Democracy and e-Administration
The field of digital government has always been dominated by two major, well
distinguishable strands that we have called democratic and technocratic narra-
tive in [19]. In the technocratic strand, digital government is about increasing the
efficiency and effectiveness of e-services offered to the citizen as a customer. In
the democratic strand, digital government is about strengthening our democra-
cies embracing the citizen as a citizen with enabling participation and fostering
transparency. However, we should not assume that these narratives are a perfect
reflection of the underlying forces and motivation driving the development of
digital government. Indeed, a strong motivational force is automation of work
– similar to industrial automation – even if no e-services are offered or partic-
ipation encouraged. We will start using the notion of e-administration, defined
as the automation aspect of digital government. Now, e-administration can be
opposed to e-democracy with typical digital initiatives such as open government
data24, e-consultation, participatory budgeting, and i-voting [39], see Fig. 3.
We have to understand the evolutionary forces behind the development of
digital government. Following Bruno Latour, we can look at the modern gov-
ernment authorities as a network of people and automated software systems
(e-administration), with the e-democracy component enabling feedback. Since
administrations have a tendency to grow [56], but the financial and personnel
limits are severe, the growth is naturally channeled into the development of more
and more software systems, i.e., a more elaborate e-administration. That is, the
motivation behind e-administration is not so much simplifying the work of peo-
ple working in the organization, as it is growing the power of the organization
24 https://opengovdata.org/
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via automation. We speculate that it is easier to channel regularly necessary
change into e-administration than it is to change the traditional human part
of the organization. If so, then a more automated digital government could be
more flexible while the pace of organizational change would slow down. This
hypothesis needs to be confirmed yet.
As the e-administration component grows, so does the need for data: first,
automated systems manage to handle practically unlimited amounts of data,
second, machine learning and A.I. create a possibility to predict risks in various
spheres and thus to both optimize organizational processes and to take a more
proactive stance. As examples, consider public transport and road network op-
timizations, distribution of firefighting and police resources, selecting tax audit
targets etc. Since more power needs more feedback for stability, we might expect
the e-democracy component to be driven by the growth of e-administration.
7 Conclusion
Currently, the level of digital government implementation, i.e., the pervasive-
ness of digital government, is discussed prominently in terms of data, i.e., as
proceeding form ICT-driven to data-centric digital government. This comes as
no surprise, given the substantial developments in the data technology sector,
with Big data and data science. Indeed, there are still vast opportunities to ex-
ploit data at state level to better the government’s effectiveness, accountability
and inclusiveness. At the same time, the risk that citizens’ data are misused for
citizens’ surveillance and control will never vanish. The challenge is in getting
the data governance structure right. And this challenge needs to be understood
early in all digital government design issues and, therefore, needs to be reflected
in each approach to digital government architecture.
Technologies come and go. Emerging technologies drive change. Emerging
ICT technologies drive digital transformation. In three decades now, the field of
digital government has always shown a particularly optimistic approach to be
determined by emerging technologies. Digital government has always been ICT-
driven. But what is the function of digital government? It should be more than
making public administration more efficient and effective. It should be in con-
necting governments with citizens. And what is the form of digital government?
Government has an institutional design. This institutional design gains primacy
in the architecture of digital government ecosystems. We argue that the architec-
ture of any digital government ecosystem can be identified, essentially, with its
data governance architecture, which links data assets with accountable organiza-
tions, supporting a range of data governance principles. We are convinced, that
such viewpoint not only helps to analyze existing digital government ecosystems,
solutions and technologies alike; but is also a key to shaping the next generation
of digital government.
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